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Supreme Court Rulings on 
Abortion: Roe v. Wade and 
Selected Progeny 
Donald F. Uerling 
Introduction 
Abortion is one of the most controversial and contentious issues of 
our time. Few topics generate as much public debate or leave as little 
room for political compromise. This article presents a discussion of 
selected United States Supreme Court decisions on abortion and the 
legal reasoning supporting those decisions. 
It should be noted initially that laws regulating abortion are 
enacted by either state legislatures or the Congress. Disputes over 
abortion arise when a statute that regulates abortion in some way is 
challenged as being in violation of individual constitutional rights. 
Since 1971, there have been 28 Supreme Court decisions that 
have addressed various issues related to abortion. Most addressed 
state or federal statutes that provided specifically for abortions; a few 
involved statutes that addressed broader issues including abortions. 
Although each decision was of some importance, the major 
principles of law pertaining to abortion were established in three 
major decisions -- Roe v. Wade (1973), Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), and Stenberg v. Carhart 
(2000). The principles and reasoning of these three decisions are the 
focus of the discussion that follows. 
Roe v. Wade (1973) 
The Decision 
The "landmark" decision was Roe v. Wade (1973), which held that a Texas 
criminal statute imposing restrictions on legal abortions was unconstitutional. 
Because the statute made no distinction between abortions performed early in 
pregnancy and those performed later, and it limited to a single reason, 
"saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the procedure, it could 
not survive the constitutional challenge. 
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Although this decision was quite controversial and certainly broke new 
ground in the field of constitutional law, it should be noted that the basic 
holding was by a 7-2 vote. See Roe at 115. 
History of Criminal Abortion Laws 
The Roe opinion provided a thorough discussion of the history of criminal 
abortion laws. Two points are especially worthy of note: 
It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion 
laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. 
Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at any time during 
pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life, 
are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from 
statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th 
century. Roe at 129. 
[Alt common law, abortion performed before "quickening" -- the first 
recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 
16th to the 18th week of pregnancy -- was not an indictable offense. Roe at 
132. 
Constitutional Right to Privacy 
A constitutional challenge to a statute restricting abortion must rest on some 
individual right grounded in the Constitution. In Roe, the Court found that a 
woman had a right of privacy that encompassed an abortion decision. 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line 
of decisions, however, . . . , the Court has recognized that a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does 
exist under the Constitution. 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, 
as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth 
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
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encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 
Roe at 152-53 
Right to Abortion is not Absolute 
While Roe held that the Constitution protected a woman's right to choose to 
end a pregnancy, the Court also made clear that this right was not absolute 
and that a state had important interests in both the health of the mother and 
the potential life of the unborn child. 
[Some] argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to 
terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for 
whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Roe at 153. 
[A] State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding 
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At 
some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently 
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion 
decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be 
absolute. 
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the 
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be 
considered against important state interests in regulation. Roe at 154. 
Constitutional Protections 
When the government seeks to regulate by legislation an individual's 
exercise of constitutional rights, the burden of justifying such a regulation 
depends on the nature of the interests involved. 
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that 
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling state 
interest" . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to 
express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Roe at 155. 
[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving 
and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . . and . . . it has still 
another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of 
human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in 
substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during 
pregnancy, each becomes "compelling." Roe at 162-63. 
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the 
health of the mother, the "compelling" point, in the light of present medical 
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so 
because of the now-established medical fact, ... , that until the end of the 
first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal 
childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the 
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abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the 
preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible 
state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the 
person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as 
to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it 
must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-
hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like. Roe at 163. 
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior 
to this "compelling" point, the attending physician, in consultation with his 
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his 
medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that 
decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of 
interference by the State. Roe at 163. . 
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential 
life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then 
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's 
womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both 
logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting 
fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that 
period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother. Roe at 164. 
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Roe established the basic constitutional principles pertaining to the regulation 
of abortion, and these principles remained essentially unchanged through 
ensuing years. 
Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania 
v. Casey (1992) 
The Decision 
The next major abortion decision was Planned Parenthood of Southeast 
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). Casey held that four of five provisions in a 
Pennsylvania statute regulating abortion were constitutionally permissible. 
Casey was basically a five to four decision. There were five separate 
opinions -- the Opinion of the Court, two concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, and two dissents. The opinion of the Court was an unusual ''joint 
opinion" by three justices. 
Reaffirming Roe v. Wade 
In Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic principles of Roe v. Wade 
(1973). The Court emphasized the importance of its institutional integrity and 
the rule of stare decisis. 
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After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, 
principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led 
to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained 
and once again reaffirmed. Casey at 845-46. 
Roe's essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First 
is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion 
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. 
Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support a 
prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the 
woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of 
the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains 
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health. And 
third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of 
the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus 
that may become a child. These principles do not contradict one another; 
and we adhere to each. Casey at 846. 
[I]t is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some freedom to 
terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was 
based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate. The 
woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State 
cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in 
fetal development the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the 
right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted. Casey at 
869. 
Evolution of the Law 
The Casey decision did make two significant adjustments to the analytical 
approach articulated in Roe. The Court (1) abandoned the trimester approach 
in favor of the concept of viability to determine when the interests of the 
state can override the constitutional interests of the woman and (2) 
established the undue burden standard to determine when a state law 
unconstitutionally interferes with the woman's liberty interest. The language 
of the Casey opinion is quite instructive: 
We conclude the line should be drawn at viability, so that before that time 
the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. We adhere to 
this principle for two reasons. First, as we have said, is the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Any judicial act of line-drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary, but 
Roe was a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care. We have twice 
reaffirmed it. . . .. Although we must overrule those parts of Thornburgh 
and Akron I which, in our view, are inconsistent with Roe's statement that 
the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of 
the unborn, ... , the central premise of those cases represents an unbroken 
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commitment by this Court to the essential holding of Roe. It is that premise 
which we reaffirm today. Casey at 870. 
The second reason is that the concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, 
is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and 
nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the 
second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection 
that now overrides the rights of the woman. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 
163. Consistent with other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines 
which appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But 
courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw. And there is no line 
other than viability which is more workable. To be sure, as we have said, 
there may be some medical developments that affect the precise point of 
viability, see supra, at 860, but this is an imprecision within tolerable limits 
given that the medical community and all those who must apply its 
discoveries will continue to explore the matter. The viability line also has, 
as a practical matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense it might be 
said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the 
State's intervention on behalf of the developing child. Casey at 870. 
The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the 
most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component 
of liberty we cannot renounce ..... Yet it must be remembered that Roe v. 
Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only the woman's liberty but 
also the State's 'important and legitimate interest in potential life.' [citation 
deleted] That portion of the decision in Roe has been given too little 
acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases. 
Casey at 871. 
As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps abortion has 
recognized, not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, 
ipso facto, an infringement of that right. Casey at 873 .... Only where state 
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this 
[abortion] decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Casey at 874. 
The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life 
leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed 
unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a 
pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden standard is the 
appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's 
constitutionally protected liberty. Casey at 876. 
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a 
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute 
with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to 
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further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the 
woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering 
the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect 
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be 
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends. Casey at 877. 
Some guiding principles should emerge. What is at stake is the 
woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated 
from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a 
structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a 
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are 
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of 
the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state 
measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be 
upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the 
health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an 
undue burden. Casey at 877-78. 
The Court's Summary 
The Court summarized its ruling in Casey by setting out several important 
principles: 
(a) To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. Wade while at the 
same time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential 
life, we will employ the undue burden analysis as explained in this 
opinion. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is 
invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. 
(b) We reject the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade. To promote 
the State's profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the 
State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is 
informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be 
invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose 
childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden 
on the right. 
(c) As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to 
further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. 
Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of 
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion 
impose an undue burden on the right. 
(d) Our adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central 
holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding. Regardless of 
whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a State may 
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not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate 
her pregnancy before viability. 
(e) We also reaffirm Roe's holding that "subsequent to viability, the State 
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it 
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is 
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the 
life or health of the mother." Casey at 878-79. 
The Pennsylvania Statute 
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At issue in Casey were five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control 
Act of 1982. The Court's rulings on those provisions provide a useful 
overview of some major restrictions on access to abortion: 
• A provision that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed 
consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with 
certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed, 
was ruled constitutional; 
• A provision mandating the informed consent of one parent for a minor 
to obtain an abortion, but providing a judicial bypass procedure, was 
ruled constitutional; 
• A provision defining a "medical emergency" that will excuse 
compliance with the foregoing requirements, was ruled constitutional; 
• Provisions imposing certain reporting requirements on facilities 
providing abortion services, was ruled constitutional; but, 
• A provision commanding that, unless certain exceptions apply, a 
married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating 
that she has notified her husband, was ruled unconstitutional. 
The Importance of Casey 
Casey is perhaps the most important Supreme Court abortion decision 
subsequent to Roe v. Wade. As a review of subsequent cases from courts at 
all levels shows, Casey is cited often as the controlling authority. 
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) 
The Decision 
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) struck down a Nebraska statute that criminalized 
"partial birth abortion." Stenberg was a five to four decision, with eight 
separate opinions -- the opinion of the Court, three concurrences, and four 
dissents. 
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The Conflicts 
Justice Breyer, in delivering the Opinion of the Court, explained succinctly 
the nature of the social and legal conflicts over abortion: 
We again consider the right to an abortion. We understand the controversial 
nature of the problem. Millions of Americans believe that life begins at 
conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death of 
an innocent child; they recoil at the thought of a law that would permit it. 
Other millions fear that a law that forbids abortion would condemn many 
American women to lives that lack dignity, depriving them of equal liberty 
and leading those with least resources to undergo illegal abortions with the 
attendant risks of death and suffering. Taking account of these virtually 
irreconcilable points of view, aware that constitutional law must govern a 
society whose different members sincerely hold directly opposing views, 
and considering the matter in light of the Constitution's guarantees of 
fundamental individual liberty, this Court, in the course of a generation, has 
determined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic 
protection to the woman's right to choose. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
[parallel citations deleted] (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 [parallel citations deleted] (1992). We shall not 
revisit those legal principles. Rather, we apply them to the circumstances of 
this case. Stenberg, at 920-21. 
Established Principles 
The Court noted that three established principles determined the issue before 
it and set them forth in the language of the joint opinion in Casey. 
First, before "viability ... the woman has a right to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy." 505 U.S. at 870 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter). 
Second, "a law designed to further the State's interest in fetal life 
which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal 
viability" is unconstitutional. 505 U.S. at 877. An "undue burden is ... 
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose o,r effect 
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus." Ibid. 
Third, "'subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in 
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even 
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. '" 505 U.S. 
at 879 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-165). Stenberg at 921. 
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The Nebraska Statute 
The Nebraska statute at issue in Stenberg prohibited any "partial birth 
abortion" unless that procedure is necessary to save the mother's life. It 
defined "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially 
delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the ... child." 
Holdings 
The Supreme Court held in Stenberg that Nebraska's statute that criminalized 
the performance of "partial birth abortions" violated the Federal Constitution, 
as interpreted in Casey and Roe. 
• The Nebraska statute lacked the requisite exception for an abortion 
"necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of 
the life or health of the mother." The State may promote but not 
endanger a woman's health when it regulates the methods of abortion. 
• The Nebraska statute's language prohibiting "partial birth abortion" did 
not track the medical differences between D&E and D&X, but covered 
both. Using the law's statutory terms, it was impossible to distinguish 
between D&E (where a foot or arm is drawn through the cervix) and 
D&X (where the body up to the head is drawn through the cervix). 
Both procedures can involve the introduction of a "substantial portion" 
of a still living fetus, through the cervix, into the vagina -- the very 
feature of an abortion that leads to characterizing such a procedure as 
involving "partial birth." Physicians who use D&E procedures, the 
most commonly used method for performing previability second 
trimester abortions, would fear prosecution, conviction, and 
imprisonment. The result is an undue burden upon a woman's right to 
make an abortion decision. 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 
The federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 presents a basic issue 
similar to that involved in the Nebraska statute struck down in Stenberg v. 
Carhart (2000). The federal Act makes criminal the performance of a "partial 
birth abortion" that results in the death of a fetus. The Act contains an 
exception allowing the performance of "a partial-birth abortion that is 
necessary to save the life of the mother." Id. § 1531(a). The Act does not, 
however, contain an exception for the preservation of the health of the 
mother. 
Three federal courts of appeal have ruled on constitutional challenges to 
the Act, Carhart v. Gonzales (2005), cert. granted (2005); Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America v. Gonzales (2006); National Abortion 
Federation v. Gonzales (2006). All three have held that the Act is 
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unconstitutional because it does not include an exception for abortions 
necessary to preserve the health of the mother. 
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case from the Eighth Circuit 
and may also hear the cases from the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. 
Given that Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) requires the inclusion of a health 
exception whenever "substantial medical authority" supports the medical 
necessity of the abortion procedure, it seems likely that the Court will hold 
that the federal Act is unconstitutional. 
Conclusions 
A review of the legal principles discussed above leads to a number of 
conclusions about statutory and constitutional law pertaining to abortion. 
• Both state legislatures and Congress will continue to enact statutes 
that regulate access to abortion. Any such statutory provisions, 
however, must be consistent with Supreme Court holdings, or the 
legislative efforts will be pointless. 
• The basic holding of Roe v. Wade (1973) will not be overturned. 
The Court will continue to recognize the right of a woman to 
choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain that 
abortion without undue interference from state or federal statute. 
The rule of stare decisis will hold. 
• While the State may impose some conditions on access to 
abortions even before viability, those conditions must not impose 
an undue burden on the woman's right to choose. 
• There will be more emphasis on the State's power to restrict 
abortions after viability, so long as the law provides exceptions for 
pregnancies that endanger the woman's life or health. 
• Much future litigation will be centered on these two issues: 
./ Does a specific statutory restriction pose an undue burden on a 
woman's access to a previability abortion? 
./ Does a specific pregnancy so endanger a woman's health that she 
may not be compelled to forego a postviability abortion? 
Abortion will continue to be a controversial and contentious topic in 
American society. When "Freedom of Choice" is pitted against "Right to 
Life," there is little room for compromise. 
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